The Demographic Structure of Cyprus

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Report
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography
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Introduction

1. This report has been written in response to the motion for a resolution on the demographic structure of the Cypriot communities (Doc. 6249), presented in May 1990 by Mr Matsis and other members of the Assembly. Even before the motion was tabled, the Assembly had expressed its interest in this matter.

2. For example, in May 1987, in Recommendation 1056 (1987) on national refugees and missing persons in Cyprus, the Assembly recommended that the Committee of Ministers ask the leaders of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities not to alter the demographic structure of the island and especially to avoid untimely migratory movements.

3. In September 1989, in Resolution 927 (1989) on the situation of the ethnic and Muslim minority in Bulgaria, the Assembly instructed its Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography to examine the conditions under which the Muslims from Bulgaria were received and settled in Turkey and to check that compliance with Assembly Recommendation 1056 (1987) was being observed. At the time, this paragraph was included because some members of the Assembly feared that Bulgarian nationals might settle in Cyprus.

4. When the Sub-Committee on Refugees visited Turkey in March 1990, while it was drafting its report on the reception and settlement of refugees in Turkey (Doc. 6267), it raised the question of the settlement of these persons in the northern part of Cyprus. Nevertheless, as stated in the report, the sub-committee was unable to obtain any information on this subject from the Turkish authorities.
5. The report of Mr Jean Riesen and Mr Andreas Müller (Doc. 5716), which was debated before the adoption of the above-mentioned Recommendation 1056 (1987), referred to the population movements that had taken place in Cyprus after the events of 1974 and the difficulties of establishing exact figures.

6. In order to try to gather reliable statistical data in both parts of the island, the committee authorised me to go to Cyprus for on-the-spot meetings with population experts of both communities, representatives of the political parties in the government and opposition and representatives of migrants who had settled on the island. In order to elicit information on the number of Turkish soldiers permanently stationed in the northern part of Cyprus, the committee had hoped that I would meet some Turkish army officers. This was not possible, although I did have the opportunity to talk to the Turkish ambassador in Nicosia.

7. I was in Cyprus from 4 to 8 November 1991. The programme of my visit may be found in Appendix 1. Three weeks before I set out, I forwarded the questionnaire on demographic data variations since 1974 (which may be found in Appendix 2) to demographic experts in both parts of the island, via the competent authorities, so that I could obtain precise answers during my visit.

8. After my visit to both parts of the island, the committee organised a hearing of independent experts in Paris during its meeting on 21 January 1992, with a view to supplementing and, if necessary, correcting the data I had collected.

9. The two experts invited, Professor Hansjürg Brey (Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, Munich) and Professor Günther Heinritz (Institut für Geographie, Technische Universität, Munich), the authors of one of the most recent surveys on the structure and distribution of the population on Cyprus since 19741, passed on a large amount of information that they had gathered during their visits to both parts of the island, most of which agreed with the data I had collected.

10. During this meeting, a member of the Turkish parliamentary delegation proposed that a Finnish demographic expert be invited to present his views on the matter. The committee accepted, but the expert declined the invitation, as he did not consider himself to be qualified to talk about the demographic structure of the Cypriot communities.

11. Before discussing the subject, I would like to define the terminology used to describe the two parts of Cyprus. The "southern part" of the island refers to the area controlled by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, where almost all of the Greek-Cypriot community live. The "northern part" refers to the area controlled by the Turkish-Cypriot Administration, where almost all of the Turkish-Cypriot community live.

12. I would like to conclude this section by thanking the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish-Cypriot Administration for receiving me and for their valuable co-operation, without which this report could not have been written.

**Historical Background**
13. The two salient features of Cyprus's history are: the numerous successive waves of occupation that have engulfed the island and the Greek presence on Cyprus since 2000 BC. For centuries, the island has been an interface for the peoples, civilisations and cultures of Asia, Africa and Europe.

14. For three centuries, as from 1192, the crusaders made the island into Latin Christendom's isolated, solitary bastion in the Mediterranean. In 1571, after just under a century of Venetian domination, Cyprus became a possession of the Ottoman empire. 300 years later, in 1878, the Ottomans ceded the island to Great Britain in return for British help against the mutual enemy, Russia. In 1914, the Ottoman empire declared war on Great Britain which annexed the island.

15. It was not until 16 August 1960 that Cyprus achieved independence, as a result of the agreements signed in Zurich and London in February 1959 between the representatives of United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the two Cypriot communities. These agreements rule out the uniting of the island with any other state or its partition.

16. The 1960 constitution provided for the participation of both the Greek and Turkish communities in all the institutions of the new republic. The House of Representatives, which had 50 seats, allotted 70% of them to the Greek-Cypriot community (which at that time made up approximately 80% of the population) and 30% to the Turkish-Cypriot community (which accounted for the remaining 20% or so of the population).

17. Nevertheless, the application of the constitution proved more difficult than had been expected. The two communities, which were too susceptible to the respective influences of Greece and Turkey, accused each other of violating the 1959 agreements and the 1960 constitution. In the period from 1960 to the end of 1963 part of the Greek-Cypriot population, who had played a leading role in the uprising against the British occupation, continued to defend the idea of unifying Cyprus with Greece ("Enosis"). At the end of November 1963, the Turkish-Cypriot community rejected the constitutional amendments proposed by President Makarios. Attacks on members of this community at the end of December 1963 plunged the country into a deep political crisis, which ended in the fall of the intercommunal government.

18. The continual clashes at the beginning of 1964 led the United Nations Security Council to dispatch a United Nations peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) to the island in March of the same year. It is still stationed there.

19. Between 1964 and 1967 the Cyprus crisis became one of the main sources of tension between Greece and Turkey. Despite the provisions of the 1959 agreements limiting the size of the Greek and Turkish military contingents stationed in Cyprus, Greek armed forces moved on to the island with the authorities' consent. During this period, the Turkish-Cypriot community, which felt left out of the Republic's administrative, legal and political organs, set up its own institutions.

20. In December 1967 and January 1968, following the agreements reached between Greece and Turkey, most of the Greek armed forces stationed on the island were repatriated. The political climate improved and a few months later
intercommunal talks began with a view to arriving at a just and peaceful solution of the Cypriot question.

21. On 15 July 1974, the coup d'état of Nikos Sampson, an avowed advocate of Enosis who enjoyed the open support of the military junta in power in Greece, set a real tragedy in motion. On 19 July 1974 President Makarios, who had had to leave the island, told the United Nations Security Council that the coup had led to much bloodshed and the loss of many human lives.

22. The Turkish military intervened the next day, 20 July 1974. The Turkish Government intended in this way to exercise its rights under the 1960 Guarantee Treaty. On 14 August 1974 a second wave of Turkish armed forces arrived in Cyprus and occupied the northern third of the island. The island was thus divided into two parts separated by a demarcation line. After this partition, the Greek Cypriots from the northern part of the island fled to the south and the Turkish Cypriots living in the south abandoned it to take refuge in the north. They had all therefore become refugees in their own country.

23. In 1975, the northern part occupied by the Turkish army was proclaimed the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which became the Turkish Republic of Cyprus in 1983 and is recognised only by Turkey. This unilateral declaration of independence was condemned by the United Nations Security Council.

24. The declaration of independence drove a larger wedge between the two communities and made intercommunal dialogue even more difficult, despite the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General, who had been entrusted with a mission of good offices by the international community.

25. The partition of the island, which the Council of Europe does not acknowledge, is essentially a political problem, but it also has a human dimension that is sometimes overlooked. Almost one third of the island's population has been displaced by the conflict. The size of this population movement explains why the political and humanitarian aspects of the Cypriot question are so closely linked. I agree with the committee's previous Rapporteurs, Mr Riesen and Mr Mfller, that it will be hard to find a solution to the humanitarian problems if no progress is made towards a political settlement of the dispute. Conversely, humanitarian issues (displaced and missing persons and migration) constitute substantial stumbling blocks to a political answer.

Demographic Data Up to 1974

26. The first census of the island's population was carried out by the British authorities in 1881. Any previous data on the Cypriot population come from historical archives, which sometimes contain estimates of the number of inhabitants on the island. These figures and evaluations show that, as soon as the island became a possession of the Ottoman empire, a Greek Christian and Turkish Muslim community began to live side by side on Cyprus. Travellers', consuls' or local authorities' estimates of the population under the Ottoman occupation,
although unscientific, point to substantial fluctuations in the size of the two communities. These variations are due, like those in other parts of Europe, to the population movements attendant on conquest, the expansion or decline of trade, plagues or famine.

27. The British authorities conducted a population census in 1881, three years after they had established themselves in Cyprus. The British colonial authorities subsequently published regular demographic statistics on the island's population. Appendix 3 contains the data from the censuses of 1881, 1901, those of 1921 and 1946, following the two world wars, and the registration of the population of 1956.

28. In 1881, the total population was 186 173, 137 631 or 73,9% of whom were Greek Cypriots and 45 458 or 24,4% Turkish Cypriots.

29. Twenty years later, the 1901 census showed a marked increase in the total population to 237 022. 182 739 (77,1%) were Greek Cypriots and 51 309 (21,6%) Turkish Cypriots. If these figures are compared with those recorded in 1881, it is plain that the two communities' rates of increase had varied greatly. While the Greek Cypriot population had grown by 32,7% during this period, the number of Turkish Cypriots had risen by only 12,8%. As the birth and death rates of the two communities were similar, the logical explanation for this divergence would seem to be that the setting up of the British colonial regime had caused an unquantifiable number of Turkish Cypriots to leave for the territory of the Ottoman empire.

30. In 1921, the total population amounted to 310 715, 244 887 of whom or 78,8% were Greek Cypriots and 61 339 or 19,7% Turkish Cypriots. Once again, it is difficult to say exactly why the Greek-Cypriot population has expanded faster than that of the Turkish Cypriots. The first world war, the conflict between Greece and Turkey and the massacring of the Armenian and Greek minorities in Anatolia probably impelled an unspecified number of Christians to seek refuge in Cyprus.

31. Immediately after the second world war, the census carried out by the British administration in 1946 put the total number of inhabitants at 450 114 (361 199 or 80,2% Greek Cypriots and 80 548 or 17,9% Turkish Cypriots). The rate of increase of the Greek-Cypriot population since the 1921 census had exceeded that of the Turkish Cypriots.

32. In 1956, a few years before independence, the island's population was estimated at 528 618, 417 080 (78,9%) of whom were Greek Cypriots and 91 980 (17,4%) Turkish Cypriots. These figures display a growth rate that is virtually identical for both communities and which would tally with the natural increase in the Cypriot population. These data are probably the last to be accepted by both parties without too many objections.

33. In 1960, the year Cyprus became independent, the census was conducted by the new republic. According to the Department of Statistics and Research, the island's population was 573 566, 442 138 (77,1%) of whom were Greek Cypriots and 104 320 (18,2%) Turkish Cypriots. The more substantial increase in the Turkish Cypriot population between 1954 and 1960 is probably due to the fact that more Greek Cypriots than Turkish Cypriots emigrated during this period (see
Appendix IV: "Cyprus: Migration", to Doc. 5716, report of Mr Riesen and Mr Müller.

34. The figures supplied by the Turkish-Cypriot Administration for 1960 are slightly different because they included the population of the British sovereign bases. The total population of the island is said to be 577 615 inhabitants - 448 857 (77.7%) Greek Cypriots and 104 350 (18.1%) Turkish Cypriots.

35. The Department of Statistics and Research of the Republic of Cyprus set the total population of the island in 1974 at 641 000, 506 000 (78.9%) of whom were Greek Cypriots and 118 000 (18.4%) Turkish Cypriots. The figure for the Greek-Cypriot population includes the Maronite, Armenian and Latin Christian minorities, who had opted for membership of this community, as they were allowed to do under the constitution.

36. The Turkish-Cypriot Administration provides a slightly discrepant figure for the population of this community for that year - 115 758 - but does not advance any figure for the total population of the island.

37. It is practically impossible to obtain any figures of the island's total population after partition in July 1974, as censuses have been replaced by estimates.

Data Variations Since 1974

38. I was able to meet Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot demographers in Cyprus. As I said in the introduction, they had been sent a questionnaire with a view to gathering sufficiently homogenous data on population trends, breakdown by age, migratory movements, naturalisations and a number of demographic indicators since 1974. I must make it clear here that the data I received from the Government of the Republic of Cyprus concerning the southern part of the island are exhaustive and cover every point of the questionnaire they were sent. As for the northern part of the island, the Turkish-Cypriot Administration first sent me a general memorandum and it was only on my insistence that I was handed a table containing some of the demographic data requested.

39. I have tried to supplement these data, especially those on the total population of the island, with figures from the section on Cyprus in the European Population Committee's (CDPO) report on recent demographic developments in Europe, 1991 edition, which may be found in Appendix 4. Table CY-7 shows estimates for the island's total population on 31 December each year from 1980 to 1990.

40. I used these figures to draw up a series of tables which may be found in Appendix 5. Table A, covering the period 1974 to 1990, shows for each community the total population at the end of each year, the percentage increase or decrease of the population, natural increases and net migration as a percentage and population density. The figures I had also asked for concerning the percentage of aliens in the total population were supplied only for certain years.

41. Analysis of these figures reveals spectacular divergences between the two communities, especially in the 1975-1981 period and, to a lesser degree, as from 1981. First, the population in the southern part of the island did not return to its
1974 level until 1979. This is probably explained by the sizable emigration that occurred over this period. 20 000 Greek Cypriots left the island after the events in 1974 to settle mainly in Commonwealth countries and, to a lesser extent, Greece.

42. The total population in the northern part of the island went up constantly during this period to reach 140 501 in 1979, an increase of 32 743 persons, or 28% compared with the population in 1974. This growth cannot be explained by the natural increase in the population which averaged 1.2% per annum. It must therefore be due to a substantial influx of migrants. These waves of migration were particularly large in 1975 and 1977 and less so in 1976.

43. The natural rate of increase of the population is comparable in both parts of the island as from 1981. Despite this fact, the population in the northern part is rising at a faster rate because, save in 1981, the net level of migration has always been higher in the north than in the south. Population density intensified in both parts of the island but, logically, the 35.8% increase in density in the north between 1975 and 1990 outstripped that in the south, where it was 16.2%.

44. Appendix 5 also contains table B showing various demographic indicators for both parts of the island: the total number of births, the number of deaths (which makes it possible to calculate the natural rates of increase of the population), fertility (children per woman) the crude marriage rate (marriages per 1 000 persons), the crude divorce rate, the infantile mortality rate and life expectancy at birth. The birth rates of the two parts of the island show wide disparities, especially between 1975 and 1980. These divergences are, however, partly offset by an infant mortality rate that is higher in the north than the south. The only comparable data on life expectancy at birth are those for 1979, which reveal a slightly higher life expectancy for the population in the southern part of the island.

45. Appendix 5 also includes table C giving the breakdown of the population of both parts of the island by age groups. This table shows that the 45 to 64 age group and that of the over 65s are stable. There has been a something of a drop in the 0 to 14 age group in both parts. The 15 to 44 age group, having gone up one percentage point in the south in 1980, fell back to the 1975 level in 1990. This category of the population has increased sharply since 1975 in the northern part.

46. I had asked both parts to supply data on migratory movements since 1974. I wanted to discover the number of migrants per host country and per country of origin. I also wanted to know how many foreign residents there were in both parts of the island, the number of naturalisations and the countries of origin of persons who had acquired Cypriot nationality. Only the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus gave precise answers to these questions. They may be found in Appendix 6, which also contains the incomplete data furnished by the Turkish-Cypriot Administration.

47. According to these figures, in 1990, in the southern part of Cyprus, there were 10 529 regular foreign residents, the largest group being the British (2 740). That year in the north there were only 550 aliens. This figure rose to 604 for the period 1 January to 30 September 1991. I am astonished that no Turkish nationals appear on the list of foreign residents in the northern part of Cyprus.

48. As far as naturalisation is concerned, the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus indicate that, since independence, 834 persons have taken Cypriot nationality (cf
Appendix 7). The Turkish-Cypriot Administration did not supply any information about naturalisation.

**Talks with the parties concerned in the part controlled by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus**

- **49.** On 5 November 1991, in accordance with the programme drawn up by the Greek-Cypriot authorities, I first met Mr Galanos, President of the House of Representatives and Vice-President of the Parliamentary Assembly. He said that the number of persons of Turkish origin who were settling in the northern part of the island was going up. In his opinion, their presence would affect the future, as it could upset the demographic structure of the island. Cyprus ought to be able to take advantage of the calmer atmosphere reigning in the region to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict between the two communities. Turkey ought to examine its responsibilities as regards this issue. The Cypriots wanted a federal state where the two communities could live together and forget their past differences.

- **50.** At the meeting which took up the rest of the morning of 5 November 1991, experts from the Republic of Cyprus presented me with the diverse sets of demographic data analysed in the previous section.

- **51.** Mr Matsis, a member of the Assembly, who attended the meeting, stated that the arrival of the Turkish settlers jeopardised the political balance on the island. He emphasised that the leaders of the Turkish-Cypriot opposition were also worried about the presence of the settlers, especially as the emigration of Turkish Cypriots meant that this Turkish presence might lead to the loss of identity of the Turkish-Cypriot community as such. The American proposal to call an international conference on the Cypriot question had come to nothing because of the intransigence of the leaders of the Turkish-Cypriot Administration, first and foremost Mr Denktash, one of the people who was keenest to change the demographic structure of the island.

- **52.** Mr Clerides, Chairman of the Democratic Rally Party (DRP) drew attention to the fact that the Turkish invasion had caused 180 000 Greek Cypriots, who had been resident in the northern part of the island, to go to the south. The vacuum had been filled by Turkish settlers. Their arrival constituted an attempt to alter the population structure of the occupied areas. The DRP's contacts with various political parties from the north had revealed the urgency of reaching a solution, otherwise the Turkish-Cypriot community would become a minority in the northern part. The settlers were likely to vote for Mr Denktash's National Unity Party (NUP). Every election in the northern part was preceded by a massive naturalisation campaign. Negotiations to end the dispute had to be held between representatives of both communities. Recently, at the United Nations, Turkey had given the impression that it might discuss a partial withdrawal from the territory it was occupying, in order to enable some 85 000 Greek Cypriots to return to their homes. Any agreement would have to be guaranteed by the international
community. Both communities would naturally have to feel secure for any solution to be reached. This required more extensive international peace guarantees. Cyprus would like to join the European Community. Its members could guarantee its territorial integrity. Time was working against a solution of the problem. In both parts of the island, it was becoming increasingly difficult to find young politicians who had contacts with the other side. In the north, the opposition parties rejected the presence of the Turkish army and settlers more and more, whereas the parties in power were in favour of perpetuating the division.

53. Mr Christofias, Secretary General of AKEL (the Communist Party) considered that the occupation of Cyprus by a foreign country which claimed to be European, was an anachronism. If the issue were to be solved, each party would have to shoulder its responsibilities. The occupying power also had responsibilities. AKEL had contacts with many Turkish Cypriots who were extremely worried about the presence of the settlers, whose numbers were estimated to be 65,000. This figure had been quoted by the representatives of the Republican Turkish Party (RTP), an opposition party which wanted the reunification of the island. According to reports from the north, the Turkish Cypriots were steadily being ousted from the running of the country's affairs. Any Greek-Cypriot would feel the same, if the percentage of Greeks in the south were as high as that of Turkish nationals in the north. The sense of security that the Turkish presence had given the Turkish Cypriots from 1974 to 1980 had gradually given way to distrust in face of what was perceived as creeping colonisation. The question of the settlers would now have to be an item on the agenda of any negotiations between the two communities. It would be unacceptable for foreigners to decide Cyprus's future. The settlers ought to receive compensation and return to Turkey. Of course, the issue of mixed marriages would have to be carefully examined.

54. Mr Lyssarides, Chairman of EDEK (the Socialist Party) was in favour of a solution guaranteeing the human rights of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The presence of foreign armies on Cypriot soil to back an intercommunal agreement was unacceptable, save when they were part of a United Nations contingent. The presence of the settlers in the northern part of the island was a demographic and political dilemma, because they were likely to turn into a majority in that part of the island. The Turkish-Cypriot political parties were displeased with the settlement policy. The solution of the Cypriot conflict lay in the departure of the settlers, who ought to be compensated. Nevertheless, the settlers provided Mr Denktash with a vital electoral base.

55. Mr Kyprianou, Chairman of the Democratic Party (DP) and Mrs Catselli, a member of the party and former member of the Parliamentary Assembly, said that the presence of settlers in the northern part of Cyprus was a deliberate attempt to change the population structure of the island. The issue of the settlers had become a major stumbling block to solving the Cypriot problem. Turkey, had carried out a deliberate colonisation policy with a view to annexing the northern part of the island. As the settlers had arrived, many Turkish Cypriots had left. These facts did not seem to worry the leaders of the Turkish-Cypriot Administration who needed the electoral support of the settlers, whose presence came in addition to that of the
Turkish army. There were probably more than 80 000 soldiers and settlers in Cyprus in total. The settling of Turkish nationals in Cyprus was part of a Turkish plan to complicate the Cypriot question. In the opinion of Mrs Catselli, the installing of settlers violated the 4th Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war. Most of the Turkish settlers ought to leave the island. Those who were married to Cypriots were entitled to stay under current legislation. Turkey raised the humanitarian aspect of repatriating settlers only when this suited it.

56. Mr Vassiliou, President of the Republic of Cyprus, was very pleased about the interest shown by the Parliamentary Assembly in the Cyprus question. In the new international climate prevailing in the region, it would be to the advantage of Europe, the United States and Russia if the conflict were solved. The inflexibility of Mr Denktash was indeed an obstacle to this. Similarly, Turkey's attitude was extremely counter-productive, as it encouraged the intransigence of Mr Denktash. Nonetheless, one should not lose heart, as the United States were drafting some new proposals which might ease the situation. Turkey had always claimed that the two Cypriot communities could not live together. Europe had a very important role to play in the Cypriot dispute, as it could influence Turkish policy. The European Community had on several occasions asked Turkey to expedite the Cyprus file. In order to convince Turkey, it was necessary to put forward some forceful arguments demonstrating the mutual benefits of finding a solution as soon as possible. The Turkish policy of maintaining the status quo and continuing the colonisation of the northern part was unacceptable.

57. President Vassiliou considered that solving the problem of the settlers was a matter of urgency. He thus echoed the concern of many Turkish Cypriots who were finding the political, demographic, economic and social pressure exerted on them by the settlers increasingly hard to bear. These Turkish Cypriots did not identify with the settlers. Their presence was the worst predicament now facing the Cypriot population. The problem was likely to be exacerbated by the abolition of the passport requirements between northern Cyprus and Turkey. This administrative measure could trigger a new wave of immigration. There could be no solution to the Cypriot conflict without the repatriation of the settlers. It was to be hoped that the new Turkish Government would adopt a less extremist policy on Cyprus than the previous governments. President Vassiliou was, however, aware that any new Turkish policy would be opposed by the bureaucrats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the army and certain Turkish political and business circles.

58. On 6 November 1991, I met Mr Iacovou, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, who referred to the efforts that the Secretary General of the United Nations had made in recent months to obtain some headway on the Cyprus file. The attitude of the Turkish authorities had proved to be an insurmountable barrier. How could the Turkish Cypriots enter into negotiations with the Greek Cypriots, when they were burdened with the presence in the northern part of the island of 35 000 Turkish soldiers and between 60 000 and 80 000 settlers from Turkey? These settlers had been given the vote on arrival, which had destabilised Turkish-Cypriot society. In the northern part of the island, there was now a
Turkish community who were making their weight felt in the functioning of the Turkish-Cypriot Administration. Mr Denktash had been trying to divide the island and drive a wedge between the two communities since 1955. So far he had succeeded to the detriment of the Cypriot people and he seemed determined not to come to the negotiating table. Turkey also played a very negative role whenever an attempt was made to find a solution. Europe had not brought enough pressure to bear on Turkey, despite the flagrant violations of human rights that had occurred in Cyprus. Turkey had invaded Cyprus for political and military reasons.

59. Mr Iacovou said that, despite the presence of the army of occupation in the north of the island, his government accepted negotiations with a view to achieving a federal solution. In a federation, the central government would retain responsibility for foreign affairs and all other fields would be a matter for the institutional organs of the two communities. Turkey had, however, come up with a further claim recently, that of the political equality of both communities, which would lead to the creation of two states in Cyprus with a clearly defined border. The Cypriot Government rejected this approach, as Cyprus was a single country consisting of two communities, within which citizens were on an equal footing. Any solution which sanctioned a separation of the two communities would be a sort of apartheid and a glaring infringement of human rights. It ought not to be forgotten that Turkey had installed Turkish settlers in the northern part of the island, to whom it had given property belonging to Greek Cypriots, in flagrant violation of the 4th Geneva Convention. The Cypriot Government had plenty of information about this colonisation.

60. In Mr Iacovou's opinion, my visit was the first attempt to make an objective assessment of the number of settlers in Cyprus. In 1990, the Turkish Cypriot Administration had carried out a census of the population in the northern part, but had so far refused to publish the results. The problem of settlers was compounded by that of the presence of the occupying forces of the Turkish army. Their departure, like that of the settlers, was necessary before negotiations between the two communities could be contemplated. Lastly, Mr Iacovou informed me of his disappointment with the attitude frequently adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe with regard to the Cypriot question.

Talks with the parties concerned in the part controlled by the Turkish-Cypriot Administration

61. On the morning of 6 November 1991, I crossed the demarcation line between the two parts to hold talks with the Turkish Cypriot Administration and representatives of the various political parties. In accordance with the programme established by the authorities, I was first received by Mr Atun, an MP of the National Unity Party (NUP), who introduced himself as President of the Turkish-Cypriot Legislative Assembly. The Council of Europe does not recognise this institution or the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. My position as Rapporteur is identical.
62. Mr Atun asserted that the demarcation line had come about because Turkish Cypriots had been excluded from the institutions of the Cypriot state. This line had made it possible to establish peace between the two communities. The crisis went back to 1963, when many Turkish Cypriots, who had been the victims of Greek-Cypriot attacks, had had to flee to enclaves where the Turkish-Cypriot Administration had gradually established its jurisdiction. Since 1974, the Turkish army had been defending peace and the rights of Turkish Cypriots to sovereignty. Each community was happy with the present situation. The Turkish Cypriots would like reunification and also independence as part of a just and lasting solution. It was a historical fact that the Greek Cypriots had provoked the present conflict.

63. This discussion was followed by a meeting with experts chosen by the Turkish-Cypriot Administration. They began by saying that they would like to present data on the population in the northern part of Cyprus at the Council of Europe, where the Turkish-Cypriot community had been unable to make its voice heard since 1973. The experts emphasised that the great fluctuations in the population of the northern part of the island made it extremely difficult to give any exact figures. The rise in population recorded in the northern part between 1975 and 1981 was due to the arrival of migrants from Turkey. These included many Turkish Cypriots who had returned to the island they had left during the troubles of the sixties and seventies. The experts said that they had no data on migratory movements in the northern part of the island or on naturalisations since 1974.

64. After I had expressed my disappointment about this lack of figures, one of the experts said that, between 1975 and 1977, 25 000 migrants had arrived in the northern part of the island. This figure had to be seen alongside that of the 20 000 Turkish Cypriots who had left the island between 1963 and 1974. Since then, there had been 17 000 naturalisations. Under the economic agreements between Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot Administration, 3 874 Turkish nationals had come to work on the island, but some 1 500 undeclared Turkish workers had to be added to this figure.

65. Other experts stressed the great variations in the relative size of the population of the two communities. Under the Ottoman empire, the Turkish Cypriots were in the majority. Under the British occupation they were outnumbered by the Greek Cypriots. In the experts' opinion the demographic question existed before 1974. Between 1960 and 1967, 20 000 Greek soldiers had been stationed in Cyprus and some had stayed.

66. In the afternoon of 6 November 1991, I met Mr Kotak, Chairman of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), which had polled 15% of the votes at the previous elections. It had two assembly members and was in opposition to the National Unity Party (NUP). It was part of the social-democrat movement and did not reject a federal solution at political level. Mr Kotak was at pains to point out that there had always been a substantial ebb and flow of migrants to and from Cyprus. After the second world war, many Greeks from Egypt had come to settle on the island. Between 1957 and 1963 many Turkish Cypriots had left the island because of attacks by Greek Cypriots. The Turkish-Cypriot population which had
amounted to 110 000 in 1974 had now risen to 165 000. The Greek-Cypriot population must have increased similarly. The southern part was undergoing a population explosion that was being ignored. 25 000 Lebanese had settled in southern Cyprus. Since 1974, the Turkish-Cypriot Administration had had to call on outside labour to meet the needs of diverse sectors of the economy, but less than 30 000 Turks had settled in the northern part of the island over the previous 17 years, as technicians, farmers or shepherds. The northern part of the island was the victim of an economic embargo which made it heavily dependent on Turkey. That explained why Turkish workers came to the island to take up temporary jobs. Relations between Turkish migrant workers and the Turkish-Cypriot community were excellent. 50% of the FDP's members were of Turkish origin.

67. Mr Altinisik, Secretary General of the Revival Party (RP), told me that his party, which was founded in 1984, regarded itself as liberal. Having received 11% of the votes, it had two assembly members which were in the opposition. Any solution to Cyprus's problem had to take account of events between 1960 and 1974. Since 1974, the island had experienced a peaceful period, because each community had its own sovereign government. Perhaps the setting-up of a federation or confederation would make it possible to end the dispute on an equal footing. Between 1975 and 1977 there had been a wave of immigration to the northern part of the island. Many Turkish Cypriots who had gone to Turkey, the United Kingdom or Australia had returned to the island.

68. Mr Altinisik admitted that he had been born in Ankara, had arrived in Cyprus in 1975 and had been naturalised a Turkish Cypriot five years later. There were many family ties between Turkish Cypriots and the Turks living on the island. 75% of the members of his party had been born in Turkey. He put the number of Turkish migrant workers who had arrived in Cyprus in 1975 at 8 000. Since then, the natural increase in the population had probably doubled that figure. Migrant workers generally fell into two occupational categories: managers or peasants.

69. Mr Vehbi, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), explained that his party had been founded in 1982 by the son of Mr Denktash. The SDP was in favour of peace between both communities, but on favourable terms, as the Turkish Cypriots could not relinquish any of their rights. The Turkish-Cypriot population did not wish to return to a confrontation with the Greek Cypriots. For thirty years, the Turkish Cypriots had been motivated by a concern for the security that only Turkey could provide. Peace and security necessitated two separate zones. Reunification would occur when trust had been restored. For the SDP, economic questions were central to the wrangle over Cyprus. The instability before 1974 was due to the fact that the Turkish-Cypriot community, which made up 20% of the island's population, had only a 10% stake in the economy. At a time when a solution to the conflict was being sought, the Greek-Cypriot authorities could not aspire to the settling of 60 000 to 70 000 Greek Cypriots in the north. This would place the Turkish-Cypriot population in jeopardy, as they would bring their secret terrorist organisations with them. Since 1974, a number of Turkish migrants had settled in the north of Cyprus. 25 000 of them had been naturalised. Some 5 000 to 6 000 Turkish seasonal workers should be added to this figure. A more delicate question was, however, that of undeclared workers.
who were being exploited by unscrupulous bosses in agriculture and the building industry. Socially speaking, many of the Turkish migrants came from the most underprivileged sectors of society. But there were a number of businessmen among them. As it only had one member in the assembly, the SDP carried little weight against Mr Denktash's National Unity Party, which held 45 of the 50 seats in the assembly.

70. Mr Konuloglu, Secretary General of the Türk Sen Federation of Trade Unions, estimated that 10 000 to 15 000 of a total of 70 000 workers in the north were unionised. This low level of membership allowed the authorities complete freedom of action. The trade unions were extremely worried about the presence of undeclared Turkish labour, which was leading to a substantial drop in wages. Many of these undeclared workers were brought to Cyprus by Turkish firms for employment in agriculture, public works and the building trade. Under agreements concluded between Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot Administration in 1986, skilled workers could emigrate to the north if they were needed. But firms had brought in unskilled labour. As a result, Turkish-Cypriot workmen were experiencing great difficulties in finding jobs in some economic sectors. The Türk Sen had no statistics on the number of Turkish migrants to Cyprus or on the number of naturalisations. The number of undeclared workers was thought to be some 10 000. They frequently arrived as tourists and had their passports taken away by their employers. Mr Konuloglu was not in a position to reply to my question about the existence of organised networks of illegal manpower.

71. On the evening of 6 November 1991, I acceded to the request of Mr Durduran, Chairman of the New Cyprus Party (NCP) to go to the party's headquarters to hold unscheduled talks with him. The party had been formed in 1989, following a split within the Communal Liberation Party (CLP) (see paragraph 76). At the time, Mr Durduran had been expelled from the party on account of his opposition to the Turkish presence in Cyprus. The NCP regarded itself as a left-wing party which attached great importance to democracy and human rights. The NCP thought that a solution to the Cypriot problem needed to be found urgently, as the Turkish-Cypriot community was being turned into a minority by the growing number of Turks who were settling on the island. In the absence of an official census, the NCP estimated that 55 000 Turks had been naturalised since 1974. These naturalised migrants voted for parties which did not want the Cypriot conflict to be resolved. Mr Durduran's party was against the naturalisation of Turkish migrants. This attitude was probably what had prompted the two attacks on the party's headquarters. Most Turkish migrants were the source of cheap labour, which forced down wages. Many jobs in the crafts sector were being lost because of Turkish immigration. Many Turkish Cypriots were therefore obliged to emigrate in order to earn a living.

72. I started the next day, 7 November 1991, by meeting Mr Soye, Secretary General of the Republican Turkish Party (RTP), which is in favour of a Cypriot federation and which champions human rights and greater social justice. The immigration issue in northern Cyprus had nothing to do with the strife between the two Cypriot communities. The intercommunal clashes had begun in 1963, but Cypriots had to find a solution and not dwell on the past. Since 1974 there had
been a substantial population transfer from Turkey to Cyprus. It had been presented as an economic necessity, but it had changed the Turkish-Cypriot cultural identity. The RTP put the number of Turkish migrants who had settled in Cyprus at 30 000. Following a secret agreement between Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot Administration, most of these people (who came from the Turkish countryside and had considerable difficulties in adjusting) acquired Cypriot nationality with great ease. Every election had been preceded by a wave of naturalisation. Well-known figures like Mr azal or Mr Ecevit were Turkish-Cypriot citizens. The Act on naturalisation permitted the taking of such steps. That was why the RTP had boycotted the Turkish-Cypriot Legislative Assembly resulting from the 1990 elections. At the previous elections, in 1985, it had picked up 22% of the votes.

73. Moreover, the authorities were shutting their eyes to the arrival of illegal workers who were exploited and deprived of any of their rights. They lived and worked in inhuman conditions and were accommodated in old houses in Nicosia that had been turned into boarding houses. Their presence on the labour market had pushed wages down. Turkish immigration to Cyprus was a further obstacle to solving the Cypriot conflict. To this end, the problem of Turkish migrants would also have to be remedied. The mixed marriages that had occurred would likewise have to be taken into account when the time came for discussing the migrants' future. The RTP realised that the Turkish-Cypriot population was concerned about security; Turkey's guarantee was important for that reason. Nevertheless, in this context, the RTP hoped that Cyprus as a whole would achieve the level of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms that typified the member states of the Council of Europe. The anti-democratic attitude of the authorities of the Turkish-Cypriot Administration and the Turkish Government's interference in Cyprus's domestic affairs were a sizable stumbling block to Cyprus's progress towards democracy.

74. The RTP was in favour of contacts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. When the topic of migrants had been raised with representatives of the Greek-Cypriot parties, the RTP, notwithstanding its opposition to the settling of these people in Cyprus, had stressed the need to address the humanitarian problems stemming from their presence. The problem had, however, become so serious that an increasing number of young Turkish Cypriots felt that they had no future on the island and were emigrating to the United Kingdom and Australia. According to the RTP, some 30 000 Turkish Cypriots had left the island between 1985 and 1990. This emigration would continue until an answer to the Cyprus issue was found. Turkish Cypriots did not want to live in a province of Turkey, but in a Cypriot federation.

75. When the RTP was still taking part in the debates of the Turkish-Cypriot legislative assembly, it had demanded information on the Turkish military presence on the island. Mr Denktash had replied that such data were secret. According to the legislation in force in the northern part of the island, the armed forces, the police and all the security forces would respond to the Turkish authorities as long as the strife continued on Cyprus. From figures published in the press, the RTP estimated the number of Turkish soldiers in Cyprus to be
between 20 000 and 30 000. Most returned to Turkey once their military duties ended. Only a few retired officers had settled in Turkey* for good, attracted by the authorities' promises that they would make it easy for them to acquire property, a practice completely contrary to international law.

- **76.** My meeting with Mr Akinci, Chairman of the Communal Liberation Party (CLP), concluded the series of talks with representatives of the Turkish-Cypriot opposition parties. The CLP had obtained 16% of the votes at the 1985 elections. In the local elections in 1986, it had become the second largest Turkish-Cypriot party with 25% of the total number of mayors and town councillors. Like the RTP, it had boycotted the Turkish-Cypriot Legislative Assembly resulting from the 1990 elections because of Turkish meddling through the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia, Turkish army officers and Turkish television programmes picked up in Cyprus. Furthermore, according to the CLP, the Electoral Act contained a series of anti-democratic provisions. In the 1991 by-elections, only 35% of the total number of electors had voted for Mr Denktash's National Unity Party (NUP). Mr Akinci also reported that out of a total 106 303 electors, 50 645 had abstained, this figures included 15 822 who had handed in a blank vote. Democracy had ceased to exist in the north of Cyprus after the 1990 elections, as it had a one-party system.

- **77.** Mr Akinci was very pleased that the Council of Europe was interested in the demographic structure of Cyprus. The country was in an incredible situation. The number of Turkish Cypriots was unknown. The data from the 1990 census had not been published, despite the opposition's demands. The population transfer from Turkey was continuing and was likely to be boosted by the lifting of the passport requirement for persons travelling from Turkey to Cyprus. A distinction had to be drawn between two categories of Turkish migrants: first those who had arrived in an orderly fashion between 1974 and 1980, whose number had never been officially disclosed and, secondly, those who had come in recent years as temporary or undeclared manpower. The arrival of these Turkish migrants had caused a drop in wages and the emigration of many young Turkish Cypriots to Commonwealth countries. The illegal migrants lived in deplorable conditions in the abandoned ruins of homes close to the demarcation line.

- **78.** The CLP considered that Turkish migrants to Cyprus numbered between 40 000 and 45 000, excluding undeclared workers. If one added these figures to the 30 000 to 35 000 Turkish soldiers, it was plain that Turkish Cypriots were becoming a minority in their own country. For this reason, the CLP was in favour of solving the Cyprus problem in a European context. The present status quo was not an acceptable solution. The CLP had greatly appreciated the possibility of contacting a representative of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, because only representatives of parties supporting Mr Denktash were allowed to go to Strasbourg.

- **79.** While in the part controlled by the Turkish-Cypriot Administration, I met Mr Kumcuoglu, Turkish ambassador in Nicosia, who stated that Turkey had internationally recognised the Turkish-Cypriot state and considered that the true Republic of Cyprus no longer existed, as it had been destroyed. He had a dual role in Cyprus: to be Turkish ambassador to the Turkish Republic of Northern
• 80. According to the ambassador, Turkey had signed agreements with 18 member states of the Council of Europe exempting their nationals from the obligation to carry a passport when visiting the country. Turkey had conferred the same right on Turkish-Cypriot citizens, on the basis of reciprocity. But the fact that there was no passport check did not mean that Turks could travel freely to Cyprus. They had to present identity papers, the details of which were recorded on a computer. The vast majority of Turks in Cyprus were there as tourists. Being in possession of a passport did not by any means prevent someone from working illegally. People who wanted to work in Cyprus needed a work permit. According to Turkish statistics, 2 200 Turkish workers were legally employed in Cyprus. There were about 1 500 illegal workers. 4 000 Turkish students were enrolled at Cypriot higher education establishments. Some of them might work from time to time. All Turkish universities were open to Turkish Cypriots. At present, 3 000 Turkish Cypriots were studying in Turkey. No specific agreements were required for this practice. Each university established the legal framework for such co-operation. There were a few foreign lecturers at Turkish-Cypriot universities.

• 81. Having mentioned the presence of Turkish armed forces in Cyprus, the ambassador recalled that Turkey had been obliged to intervene in 1974 in the wake of Mr Sampson's coup d'État. Turkish Cypriots had been the victims of Greek-Cypriot attacks between 1963 and 1974. The Turkish armed forces had stepped in under the 1960 Guarantee Treaty. Their presence was required as long as the discord between the two communities persisted. The Turkish army's installations in Cyprus were not permanent. For this reason, officers and soldiers had to leave the island at the end of their military duties. While it was true that the presence of the army was a demographic factor, it was equally necessary to recognise that it played an important role in keeping the peace. The number of soldiers stationed on the island was that judged necessary to fulfil that task. As ambassador, he was not authorised to reveal the number, which was a military secret.

• 82. I asked the ambassador about the exact number of Turkish citizens who had come to Cyprus since 1974. He acknowledged that the population flows between Turkey and the northern part of Cyprus had swelled since 1974. Many Turks had come to Cyprus, but Turkish Cypriots had also settled in Turkey. The Turkish authorities did not, however, see any need to keep statistics on these population movements. The authorities of the Turkish-Cypriot Administration ought to know the number of these persons. I pressed the point and his excellency Mr Kumcuoğlu said that, between 1974 and 1990, about 17 000 Turks had come to Cyprus. In reply to my questions, the ambassador explained that there was no consular register of Turkish citizens living on Cyprus, as Turkish nationals residing on Cyprus did not need to declare their presence unless they wanted to marry. The consulate had been notified of 1 500 mixed marriages since 1974.

• 83. After my talks with the Turkish ambassador, I went to the residence of Mr Denktash, the founder of the National Unity Party (NUP), who was introduced to
me as President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The talks in fact assumed the character of a long statement from Mr Denktash. He said that, for 28 years, Turkish Cypriots had been endeavouring to resist subjection by the Greek Cypriots. President Makarios was responsible for destroying the Cypriot state in 1963. The Greek and Turkish Cypriots had always lived as two separate communities. Today, despite the Greek Cypriots' heavy responsibility for events on the island, the Republic of Cyprus alone had been given international recognition. If it had not been for Turkish intervention in 1974, there would not be a single Turkish Cypriot left in the island. The Turkish-Cypriot Administration had nothing to hide from the Council of Europe. Independent experts had visited the country and had declared that human rights were being respected there. The Turkish-Cypriot Administration had not tried to alter the demographic structure of the island, it had merely brought in the labour needed by the economy. Half of the Turkish migrants who had arrived in 1974 had returned to their country and the remainder had been naturalised. It was true that there were some undeclared workers but they were deported if they were caught. The government set up by the Turkish-Cypriot community did not need Greek Cypriots. Agreements could be reached on property abandoned by both sides, but the Greek Cypriots were not prepared to share power with the Turkish Cypriots, as they considered them to be a minority. Between 1963 and 1974, the Turkish Cypriots had been driven out of the government and many of them had had to leave the country. A knowledge of what had happened then, made it easier to understand the Cypriot problem. The Turkish-Cypriot community rejected any accusations of changing the demography of the island. Mr Denktash hoped that the Turkish Cypriots, who had been deprived of their rights by the Greek Cypriots, would not be the victims of prejudiced assumptions on the part of the Council of Europe. The Turkish Cypriots had tried to build a state and they needed to be given a hearing by Europe, of which they formed part.

84. At the end of the conversation, I reminded Mr Denktash that I had come to Cyprus on the committee's instructions, that I had visited the north and the south and had heard all the parties concerned.

Talks with the parties concerned at the Headquarters of the UN Peace-Keeping Forces in Cyprus

85. Mr Camilion, the representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, was kind enough to receive me during the evening of 5 November 1991 and answer all my questions. He first drew attention to the disparity in the levels of economic development of the two parts of the island. Per capita income in the south was $10 000 against only $3 000 in the north. The northern part of Cyprus had a population of about 165 000. The number of Turkish settlers lay somewhere between 40 000 and 45 000. The settlers did have a higher birth rate than the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots probably overestimated the number of settlers, especially in recent years. The Turkish-Cypriot community's attitude to the settlers depended on their social status. An elite of Turkish managers held
high-ranking positions in the north's economy. The vast majority were, however, Anatolian peasants. There was no solidarity between the Turkish Cypriots and the settlers and some ethnic incidents had even been recorded. The ruling class in the north comprised a Turkish-Cypriot elite, followed by a middle class consisting of Turkish-Cypriot managers and some Turkish settlers, after that came a proletariat of settlers and Turkish Cypriots. The latter, who were numerically superior, were facing economic hardship and were often forced to emigrate.

86. Mr Denktash was a charismatic figure in the Turkish-Cypriot community. He personified the feelings that the Turkish Cypriots had entertained during the years leading up to 1974. Nevertheless, it was true that some of the people who had voted for Mr Denktash were settlers and that the presence of the Turkish army was a factor of intimidation. The attitude of youngsters was particularly interesting. They had been subjected to a sort of brainwashing in both parts of the island, but young Turkish Cypriots were not afraid of Greek Cypriots. Attitudes among adults were different. Turkish Cypriots did not want to return to the south, whereas Greek Cypriots felt a certain nostalgia for the north. The situation in Cyprus had changed so much since 1974 that the population had altered its way of life.

87. I asked Mr Camilion to estimate the number of troops in the island. I found these estimates extremely interesting. In the northern part of the island, there were 30,000 Turkish soldiers and a contingent of some 5,000 Turkish-Cypriot soldiers. In the southern part of the island, the Cypriot national guard had a complement of between 14,000 and 15,000 men, to which about 2,000 to 3,000 Greek soldiers and officers had to be added. There were 4,000 officers and soldiers accompanied by approximately 6,000 British civilians at the British bases in the south of the island (Akrotiri and Dhekelia), the status of which had been accepted by all parties to the 1959 agreements. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force consisted of 2,200 men.

The problem of settlers from Turkey

88. Having heard all the parties, I think that my first duty as Rapporteur is to avoid the pitfall of engaging in a war of figures. Everyone admits that, since 1975, Turkish nationals have arrived in the northern part of Cyprus. For some people they are part of a smallish migratory movement, for others they constitute regular colonisation. If, from now on, I use the term "settler" to describe these persons it is because, from the evidence I received, they actually came to settle and work in a depopulated area.

89. Both parties admit that two particularly large waves arrived in 1975 and 1977. They were probably massive as, even taking the lowest estimates, they represented the arrival of a group of persons making up more than 10% of the Turkish-Cypriot population at that time. The Turkish army also moved in permanently at that juncture. Since then, there has been a smaller, but steady flow,
although it has had less impact on the total population, owing to the simultaneous emigration of Turkish Cypriots.

- 90. It is also agreed that the Turkish settlers fall into two main categories. The vast majority are peasants and shepherds, whose life in the north of Cyprus is similar to the one they were leading in Anatolia. The other category comprises managers, businessmen and retired Turkish army officers. They are a minority who nonetheless seem to exert considerable influence on the ruling class of Turkish Cypriots.

- 91. I was not personally able to see whether the settlers had moved into particular villages. According to Professor Heinritz and Professor Brey, the population movements that followed the events of 1974 could have depopulated some villages in the north. During their visits to the northern part of Cyprus, the two professors were able to determine that this was not the case and that the settlers had moved into villages that had been abandoned by Greek Cypriots.

- 92. Especially in these villages, the settlers had preserved their original social, economic and cultural characteristics and were therefore viewed as foreign elements by a number of Turkish Cypriots. Some of the people I spoke to even claimed that the settlers were moved by religious fundamentalism, which would cause tension between the settlers and the Turkish Cypriots. The latter, who were more open to the European way of thinking, were laxer in their religious observance. This tension was likely to turn into real animosity.

- 93. As the Turkish ambassador in Nicosia indicated, there is no consular register of Turkish nationals in Cyprus. Nevertheless, it must not be assumed from this that there are no contacts between the settlers and the Turkish authorities. Most of the settlers were transferred to Cyprus as the result of a decision of the Turkish authorities and so they feel indebted for their present situation. For this reason, according to some of the people I spoke with, they are particularly sensitive to signals from the Turkish authorities, especially at election time. The elite of the settlers are said to be highly susceptible to Turkish influence. Some people even claimed that the Turkish embassy was behind the setting-up of the Revival Party, the settlers’ chief political grouping.

- 94. The aim of the Turkish-Cypriot Administration’s policy towards the settlers has been to promote their permanent establishment on the island. The settlers are granted housing, land or other properties on special terms. They are issued with a "concession certificate" which they are not entitled to sell or pass on to a third party until a period of twenty years has elapsed.

- 95. Nevertheless, the most important measure for the settlers has been the possibility of acquiring Turkish-Cypriot nationality. In 1975, the Turkish-Cypriot Administration passed Act No. 3/1975, under which nationality could be given to anyone who requested it and, in particular, to members of the Turkish armed forces who had served in Cyprus, the wives, children and brothers of members of these forces who had fallen in Cyprus between 20 July 1974 and 20 August 1974 or to persons who had served in the Turkish Resistance Organisation in Cyprus or Turkey.

- 96. In 1981, a regulation on the acquisition of the nationality of the state in exceptional cases supplemented these provisions. This text provides for the
granting of Turkish-Cypriot nationality to persons permanently resident in the northern part of Cyprus for at least one year, to persons who have made or who could make an important contribution to the economy, to those who have contributed to social and cultural life, the development of external relations or the raising of the standard of education and to all those who have rendered services the continuation of which is vital to the security forces. Proof must, however, be supplied in all cases. One of the last provisions of this regulation also permits the granting of nationality to any person, when the authorities consider this to be necessary.

- 97. For the settlers, a whole series of political rights were attendant on the acquisition of nationality. The most important of these rights is undoubtedly the right to vote. At first the settlers voted en masse for Mr Denktash's National Unity Party. Nevertheless, between 1978 and 1981 some small political parties came into being (Turkish Unity Party, Reform and Prosperity Party and Social Justice Party). They were strongly flavoured with Turkish nationalism and quite openly proclaimed their intention to build a Turkish nation. Their poor showing at various elections furthered the emergence of a new party, at the instigation (according to some people) of the Turkish authorities. As I said earlier, this was the Revival Party, which is in favour of maintaining the present status quo.

**Other population flows**

- 98. To complete the demographic picture of Cyprus, account must also be taken of the presence on the island of several groups of aliens, the biggest being the Turkish army in the north of the island which, according to some estimates, numbers some 30,000 men. This is a very substantial figure, equivalent to some 15% of the total population of the northern part of Cyprus. When travelling about in this part of the island, I noted the highly conspicuous presence of the Turkish army.

- 99. The two British military bases provided for in the 1959 agreements are located in the southern part of the island. They are manned by approximately 4,000 soldiers and officers accompanied by 6,000 civilians.

- 100. In recent months, the southern part of Cyprus has been facing a dearth of manpower in some branches of the economy such as the building trade, public works and the service industries. This situation has led trade unions and employers to sign an agreement whereby migrant workers may be called in. The number of the migrant workers who will be allowed to work in the southern part of the island has not been specified. Firms wishing to employ foreigners will have to submit a formal application to the Cypriot Ministry of Labour, which has said that each case will be examined individually by a tripartite committee consisting of representatives of the ministry, trade unions and employers.

- 101. Cyprus's geographical position has meant that it has also taken in a very large number of Lebanese, who have traditionally used the south of the island as a refuge whenever fighting rages in their country. Their situation has been dealt
with at length in Mr Flückiger's report on the situation of the Lebanese civilian population fleeing the country (Doc. 6155). I can only reiterate what is said in the report. Lebanese citizens went to Cyprus on account of its geographical proximity and as a first leg of a long journey which generally took them to other European countries or the United States. On the whole, those who have remained in Cyprus live in hope of returning to the Lebanon as soon as circumstances permit. The Lebanese who are living in Cyprus at present hold a temporary residence permit and are registered with the Immigration Office. In 1990 they numbered 1 410.

102. A further factor to be borne in mind is the tradition of emigration among the Cypriot population. Even before independence, Cyprus, like so many other countries in southern Europe, had long been a country of emigration. Cypriots left the island to seek better living and working conditions above all in Australia, the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries. The improved economic situation, especially in the south of the island, has meant that there is virtually no emigration from this part of the island today. In the absence of statistics on migratory movements, it is difficult to gain a clear picture of the situation in the north. These movements are not even shown in the annual statistics published by the Turkish-Cypriot Administration, which merely contain a large section on tourism, recording the number of arrivals and departures of foreign nationals and Turkish Cypriots. The difference between the number of arrivals and departures between 1978 and 1988 reveals that some 10 000 Turkish Cypriots have emigrated. According to statements from the Turkish-Cypriot opposition parties, emigration is continuing, particularly among young people.

Conclusions

103. Before presenting the conclusions I have drawn from my talks and the data I gathered, I would like to make it clear that the main purpose of this report was to study developments in the structure of the population in Cyprus. The difficulties I encountered make me think that this aim was too ambitious. In spite of everything, I tried to separate reality from the confused mass of data and information. The real situation appears to be highly complex and full of contradictions, hence the risk of offending the sensitivities of various parties throughout this report. Nevertheless, the sole concern that has guided me in my capacity as Rapporteur has been to make a contribution, however modest, to the efforts of all those who are striving to solve the Cypriot conflict through dialogue. Above all, I would not like this report to be used to fan the quarrels between the two communities.

104. I drew a preliminary conclusion from my talks with all the parties concerned: the establishment of Turkish settlers in the northern part of the island is an undisputed fact, although there is controversy over the figures. The settlers were mentioned by everyone I spoke to.

105. This influx of Turkish settlers has had a real impact on the structure of the population in the northern part of the island. According to the Turkish-Cypriot Administration, the population here went up from 115 600 in 1974 to 148 500 in
1979. This increase of 32,900 persons is much larger than the natural rate of increase of the population, which worked out at a mere 7,843 over that period. It is therefore the result of a net migratory movement of 25,057 persons. I have no grounds for asserting that all arrivals were Turkish settlers, but neither do I have any reason to assume that, during this period, there was no emigration by Turkish Cypriots comparable to that of the Greek Cypriots, above all to Australia, the United Kingdom and the other countries of the Commonwealth. No matter what the reasons are, a 28% surge in the population in five years is quite exceptional, wherever it occurs.

- 106. The arrival and establishment of the Turkish settlers is the most notable demographic occurrence in Cyprus since 1974. One only has to consult the statistical tables to see that chief demographic indicators (natural rate of increase of the population, marriage, divorce and infantile mortality rates) from 1974 up to the present display quite comparable trends for both communities. Only one indicator, the fertility rate, shows a substantial divergence, especially between 1975 and 1980. It is higher in the north than in the south, which confirms the effect of the settlers' arrival on the island's demography.

- 107. The two communities have different stances on the issue of the Turkish settlers. The Greek Cypriots are extremely worried about a situation which they regard as serious and accuse the Turkish-Cypriot Administration of conducting a policy to promote colonisation. In the northern part of the island, the attitude to the establishment of Turkish settlers seems to have changed considerably since 1974. While these settlers were at first seen by the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots as a vital injection of the additional manpower needed by the country, over the years their growing numbers and the role that some of them play in political life have changed initial perceptions and introduced wide divergences within the Turkish-Cypriot community.

- 108. The parties in control of the Turkish-Cypriot Administration first played down the number of settlers and then said that their presence was not a problem. The opposition parties, on the other hand, vigorously denounce the arrival of the settlers, their naturalisation and their use for electoral purposes by the ruling parties.

- 109. I personally think that the arrival of the Turkish settlers in the island is less serious than their naturalisation by the Turkish-Cypriot Administration. In the light of events in 1974, I could accept that the northern part of Cyprus, like other European countries, had to call on Turkish migrant workers in order to overcome the shortage of manpower. But the 1975 Act on naturalisation, passed by the Turkish-Cypriot Administration, clearly shows that it was already deliberate policy to give these Turkish nationals Cypriot nationality. The 1981 regulation supplementing the Act merely strengthens this impression. A decision by the authorities is all that is needed for a person to acquire Cypriot nationality.

- 110. The very existence of these legal texts giving the Turkish-Cypriot Administration enormous discretion in the matter of acquiring nationality, leads me to believe that the opposition parties' allegations about waves of naturalisation prior to each election, are probably based on fact.
111. Compared with the demographic impact of the Turkish settlers' establishment in Cyprus, the other migratory flows in Cyprus since 1974 have been of minor importance, as is proved by the fact that the arrival of other foreigners in the north and south of the island was mentioned only occasionally in my talks with the parties concerned.

112. In my conclusions I must also draw attention to the demographic impact of the presence of the Turkish army in the northern part of Cyprus. Even if we take the lowest estimate of a contingent of 30 000 men and a population totalling 180 000 persons, this works out at one soldier per six civilians, a ratio that must be unique in Europe.

113. The structure of the population in Cyprus is a matter of concern not only to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Since the partitioning of the island in 1974, the international community has expressed an opinion on the subject in various settings. At the beginning, the texts adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights or the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries went no further than requesting the parties not to change the demographic structure of Cyprus.

114. Towards the end of the eighties, however, the question of the settlers was referred to openly. For example, the communiqués of the Commonwealth Heads of Government (Vancouver 1987, Kuala Lumpur 1989 and Harare 1991) contain explicit references to the need for a speedy withdrawal of all foreign troops and settlers from Cyprus. A similar anxiety was expressed at various ministerial meetings of the non-aligned countries, which likewise called for the immediate withdrawal of the occupying forces and settlers (New York 1987, Belgrade 1989 and Algiers 1990). The European Parliament, in a resolution adopted in May 1988 on the situation on Cyprus, was also in favour of establishing a precise timetable for the withdrawal of the Turkish troops and settlers.

115. All the foregoing leads me to the conclusion that the presence and naturalisation of the settlers indubitably constitutes a further barrier to a peaceful negotiated solution of the Cypriot conflict. The many political disputes and wrangles over refugees, missing persons or the destruction of cultural property aggravate a problem, the humanitarian dimensions of which are plain for all to see. Moreover, the more settlers there are, the more difficult it will be to find a solution that is acceptable to both communities and the settlers themselves.

116. The complexity of the Cyprus issue has often been used in some quarters as a pretext for inaction. As Rapporteur I believe on the contrary that, despite the difficulties, the Council of Europe has a role to play in helping to find a solution to a crisis involving several of its member states. Keeping determinedly to demographic questions, I think that the holding of a census in both parts of the island is a matter of extreme urgency, in view of the absence of reliable data on the island's population. It is time that estimates are replaced by genuine data. An independent body should be made responsible for conducting the census. Why not put the European Population Committee (CDPO) in charge of it? Its demographers are internationally recognised for their competence and independence.
117. I also think that it is absolutely necessary to carry out strict checks on foreign tourists and workers arriving on the island. It is equally essential to record the migratory movements of the Cypriot population with accuracy. No one is able to say how many Cypriots, who have retained their nationality, are living abroad at present.

118. The Turkish-Cypriot Administration must also be called upon to reconsider the Act on naturalisation in force in the part of the island under its control. The liberal way the administration has applied it up until now is becoming a divisive element within the Turkish-Cypriot community itself.

119. All these measures ought to permit the gradual establishment of a climate of trust between the two communities. Dialogue to find a solution to the dispute will be possible only in such a climate. This dialogue must really be open to all Cypriots. I personally have the impression that the present Turkish-Cypriot Administration does not pay sufficient heed to the opposition's points of view when reflecting on the island's future.

120. In conclusion, I would like to make it clear that in both the north and the south of Cyprus I met many people who obviously wanted to see the conflict settled through dialogue. This is a hopeful sign. As Rapporteur it only remains for me to hope that the member states of the Council of Europe will give their full support to the efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations to achieve the re-establishment of a law-based state in the whole of Cyprus as soon as possible.