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| Letter of the President of the Republic Mr. Demetris Christofias sent to the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council and the heads of EU member-states
20/01/2010 |
I am writing to inform you about the latest developments in the Cyprus negotiations and to submit an evaluation of the recently submitted proposals of the Turkish side.
It is well known that the separate referenda of April 2004 on the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem were followed by a stalemate of three years. Immediately after my election as President, in February, 2008, I took a series of initiatives that led to the commencement of intercommunal talks which continue until today.
As agreed with the Secretary-General of the UN, these negotiations are conducted on the basis of the principle of Cypriot ownership, without strict timetables and without any possibility of a new arbitration. It is also agreed that the negotiations are conducted under the auspices of the UN, whose role is to facilitate.
The above-mentioned procedure was adopted by relevant Security Council resolutions. This was done in order to avoid the repetition of bitter experiences of the past, when foreigners prepared the Annan Plan and imposed the one-sided arbitration in favour of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side. This ended up in an unfair and unbalanced plan and a non-functional and non-viable proposed settlement. For these reasons, that plan was fairly rejected by 76% of the Greek Cypriots.
It was, therefore, essential to bring about such substantial improvements in the various aspects of the Cyprus problem that would allow a possible agreement to be acceptable to the Greek Cypriots. During the current negotiating process, the Greek Cypriot side has consistently adhered to this approach.
At the same time, the Greek Cypriot side, during the tabling of its positions at the negotiation table, has been extremely careful to avoid tipping the sensitive balance created all these years in the framework of the Secretary-General's Good Offices. Indeed, every neutral observer would easily conclude that our positions respect this balance, especially issues such as that of representation in the federal institutions, decision-making, etc, which concern the agreed basis/framework of a solution, namely, one state with a single sovereignty, single international personality and single citizenship; a bizonal, bicommunal federation, with political equality as set out in the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.
The Greek Cypriot side, in proposing the rotating presidency with weighted voting, had the intention of strengthening the institution of the Presidency for the benefit of both communities whilst maintaining some of the elements that comprised the Annan proposal on the executive. It will be recalled that the Annan proposal for the executive established the rotation period as 4:2. It also incorporated the principle of cross voting in the election of the executive. These elements were fully observed in the Greek Cypriot proposal which enshrines the concept that the political weight of the Turkish Cypriot community in electing the Greek Cypriot President/Vice president is equal to the political weight of the Greek Cypriots in electing the Turkish Cypriot President/Vice President.
It is thus regrettable that the Turkish Cypriots did not adhere to a similar standpoint. Many of their positions contradict both the agreed basis, as well as the sensitive balance, created throughout these years. As an indication, and by no means an exhaustive one, I wish to highlight some examples, as follows:
· The Annan Plan provided for rotational presidency on a 2:1 ratio, despite the population ratio being 4:1. The Turkish Cypriots insist on a 3:2 ratio.
· The Annan Plan provided for 6:3 ratio for the Council of Ministers. The Turkish Cypriot side insists on a 7:5 ratio.
· As regards decision-making in the Council of Ministers, the Annan Plan provided for at least one vote from each community. The Turkish Cypriot side demands concurrent favourable vote of both the President and the Vice-President to take a decision.
· The Annan Plan provided for special majorities only in the Senate, however the Turkish Cypriots insist on special majorities also in the Lower House.
· The Annan Plan provided that the Director and Vice-Director for 5-6 federal departments will not hail from the same federated unit and that the decisions will be taken jointly. The Turkish Cypriot side demands this to be in force for all federal departments, institutions and administrative organs.
· The Annan Plan provided that decisions on external relations within the sphere of competences of the constituent states shall be made after consultation with them. The position of the Turkish Cypriot side is that such decisions shall be made in agreement with them.
· The Annan Plan provided that the federated units have a right to conclude international agreements on commercial and cultural matters. The Turkish Cypriot side demands such right for all the competences of the federated units, which inter alia, would contravene the agreed principle of a single international personality.
· The Annan Plan provided for a single FIR. The Turkish Cypriot side demands two FIRs.
· The Annan plan provided that any past act shall be recognised as valid provided, inter alia, that it is not inconsistent with international law. The Turkish Cypriot side does not accept this.
The above instances show that the Turkish Cypriot side supports positions which contravene the agreed basis and the sensitive balances which have been shaped during decades of negotiations. It is not possible to expect the Greek Cypriot side to accept positions which are beyond the balances and in fact to such a degree. Even if we were to accept them, it is certain that they would be rejected in a new referendum, disastrous for the prospects of a mutually acceptable settlement of the Cyprus problem.
The forthcoming intensified round of talks starting today is of vital importance for the outcome of the entire effort. It is obvious that in order to continue to a final round, there must be such convergence which would allow for this to take place. This is further necessitated because, as we had agreed, this time there will be no arbitration, but a clearly Cypriot-owned solution.
In closing, the Greek Cypriot side wishes to assure you of its unwavering commitment to the aim of reaching a comprehensive settlement based on the UN Security Council Resolutions, the values and principles of the EU as well as on the agreed framework for a single, federal, bizonal, bicommunal state, with single sovereignty, single international personality, single citizenship and political equality as set out in the relevant Security Council resolutions, that would safeguard the human rights and freedoms of all Cypriots. |
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